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The Trolley and the Sorites
John Martin Fischer
In two fascinating and provocative papers, Judith Jarvis Thomson dis-
cusses the "Trolley Problem."' In this paper I shall present my own
version of the problem. I explain the problem and its apparent signifi-
cance. Then I present a series of cases which calls into question the intui-
tive judgments which generate the original problem. Thus, I propose to
dissolve the problem. The method of argumentation that issues in this
dissolution might be considered troublesome. For this reason I explore
certain objections to the methodology. Finally, I undertake to explain
the significance of the dissolution of the problem.
II
Let us follow Thomson in calling the first case "Bystander-at-the-
Switch." A trolley is hurtling down the tracks. There are five "inno-
cent" persons on the track ahead of the trolley, and they will all be killed
if the trolley continues going straight ahead.2 There is a spur of track
leading off to the right. The brakes of the trolley have failed, and you are
strolling by the track. You see that you could throw a switch that would
cause the trolley to go onto the right spur. Unfortunately, there is one
1. "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem," The Monist (April 1976): 204-17; and "The
Trolley Problem," The Yale Law Journal 94 (May 1985): 1395-1415. Both articles are reprinted in
William Parent, ed., Rights Restitution, and Risk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 78-
116. Thomson attributes the original formulation and discussion of the problem to Philippa Foot,
"The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," Oxford Review 5 (1967): 5. I
have discussed this set of issues in John Martin Fischer, "Thoughts on the Trolley Problem," in John
Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, eds., Ethics" Problems and Principles (Fort Worth, Texas:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, forthcoming 1991); and "Tooley and the Trolley," Philosophical Studies
62 (1991): 93-100; and in John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, "Thomson and the Trolley"
(manuscript); and "Quinn on Doing and Allowing," Philosophical Review (forthcoming). There is
also a selection of articles pertaining to the Trolley Problem in Fischer and Ravizza, eds., Ethics.
2. I shall use "innocent" in a rather broad sense to mean that the persons have not done
anything morally wrong for which they "deserve" to die or have forfeited their right to life, etc.
Further, I shall assume throughout this paper that no "special" facts distinguish the persons
involved in the cases. For instance, none of the six persons involved in "Bystander-at-the-Switch" is
a mass-murderer, great scientist, and so forth; further, one has not made special arrangements with
any of them. Of course, I shall be engaging in schematic and partial descriptions of the various
cases, and the reader will need to keep in mind that certain ways of filling in the details of the cases
will affect the moral judgments appropriate to the cases.
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innocent person on that spur of track. You are an "innocent bystander,"
Le., not an employee of the railroad, and so forth. You can throw the
switch, saving the five persons but causing the one to die, or you can do
nothing, thereby allowing the five to die. What should you do?
Well, it seems that it would at least be permissible for you to turn the
trolley to the right, thus saving the five but killing the one. Perhaps it is
also obligatory to do this, but it is at least intuitively plausible that one
may turn the trolley to the right.
But consider now a second case, "Fat Man." You are standing on a
bridge watching a trolley hurtling down the tracks toward five innocent
persons. The brakes have failed, and the only way in which you can stop
the train is by impeding its progress by throwing a heavy object in its
path. There is a fat man standing on the bridge next to you, and you
could push him over the railing and onto the tracks below. If you do so,
the fat man will die but the five will be saved.
What ought you to do? Whatever else is true about the situation, it
seems that it would be impermissible for you to push the fat man over the
railing. Thomson emphasizes this point, saying, "Everybody to whom I
have put this case says it would not be [permissible]." 3 But now the
question arises, why is it permissible to save the five in "Bystander" but
not in "Fat Man"? By reference to what general principle (or principles)
can the two cases be distinguished morally?
Consider a third case, "Transplant." Imagine that you are a sur-
geon-a truly great surgeon. Now there are five persons in the hospital,
each of whom needs an organ in order to survive. It just happens that an
innocent visitor has arrived in the hospital, and you know that he is
tissue-compatible with all the people who need organs, and that you
could cut him up and distribute his parts among the five who need them.
Would it be permissible for you to perform the operation (without his
consent)? It seems quite evident that it would not be permissible for you
to proceed. But why is it permissible for you to save the five in
"Bystander" but not in "Transplant"? Why exactly are "Fat Man" and
"Transplant" morally similar to each other but crucially different from
"Bystander"? This is, I believe, a particularly perspicuous formulation
of the Trolley Problem.
The Trolley Problem can be seen to be a problem for both major kinds
of ethical theory: consequentialism and deontology. Consequentialism
enjoins the maximization of some impersonally defined good.4 A certain
sort of consequentialist would seem to have a difficult time explaining
why one could save the five in "Bystander" but not in "Fat Man" and
"Transplant." For it seems that a consequentialist would need to pre-
3. Thomson, "The Trolley Problem", in Parent, ed., Rights, 109.
4. For a useful definition and analysis of consequentialism, see Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of
Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
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scribe saving the five in all the cases. The Trolley Problem is also a
problem for the deontologist, who believes there are constraints on the
maximization of the good. A certain sort of deontologist will want to
agree with the intuitive judgments presented above according to which
one may save the five in "Bystander" but not in "Fat Man" and "Trans-
plant." Such a theorist will need to generate a principle which would
have these results. Another sort of deontologist might wish to deny that
it is permissible to save the five in any of the cases. But even this sort of
theorist will need to explain away the evident plausibility of the intuition
that one may save the five in "Bystander."
III
Upon first considering the above cases, I agreed with the pattern of
intuitive judgment which produces the Trolley Problem. I took the chal-
lenge to be to generate a (deontological) principle or set of principles
which would explain and suitably systematize the constellation of intu-
itions. But having reflected on the examples, a rather startling thing hap-
pened: I realized that a set of considerations which seem quite
unassailable might lead one to think that all of the cases are morally on a
par. That is, despite the apparent moral differences between the cases
presented above (and similar cases), I began to think that there was a
way to establish that the cases were morally similar at a deep level. The
method of argumentation for this admittedly surprising-and alarm-
ing-assimilation of seemingly disparate cases proceeds via the construc-
tion of intermediary examples.
Before presenting this set of considerations, I pause to explain what I
mean by the crucial phrases, "morally similar,". "morally equivalent,"
"morally on a par," and so forth. In this paper I am using these phrases
in a somewhat "technical" sense. That is, by these phrases I do not mean
to indicate total moral sameness. Rather, I mean to indicate that certain
key moral claims are the same in the cases. More specifically, I mean to
indicate that the claims about the permissibility or impermissibility of
saving the five are the same in each case. Thus, in this paper, when I
claim that two cases are appropriately assimilated morally, I shall not
mean that they are properly treated as the same in all moral respects;
rather, I shall mean that the claims about the permissibility or impermis-
sibility of saving the five have the same truth value. (Put in terms that
are compatible with a non-cognitivist approach to ethical language, to
say that two cases are to be assimilated morally is to say that it is permis-
sible to save the five in one case if and only if it is permissible to save the
five in the other.)
To proceed, let us consider a fourth case, "Ramp." "Ramp" is in
many respects quite similar to "Fat Man": there is a trolley hurtling
down a track toward five innocent persons, and an innocent fat man
1992]
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standing on a bridge above the tracks. Let us suppose that the bridge is a
railroad bridge (i.e., with railroad tracks on it). And let us imagine that
you could push a button that would cause a ramp to go up underneath
the trolley. Further, if you were to push the button and thus cause the
ramp to go up, you would thereby cause the trolley to jump up to the
tracks on the bridge and to continue along those tracks. If you were to
push the button, you would save the five, but, regrettably, the trolley
would run over the fat man. In "Fat Man" the only way in which you
could save the five would be by shoving the fat man onto the trolley. In
"Ramp" the only way in which you could save the five would be by
"shoving the trolley onto the fat man." In all other respects the cases are
the same, and I have a strong inclination to say that "Fat Man" and
"Ramp" are morally on a par.
To strengthen my point, consider "Fat Man*." In "Fat Man" the
situation is exactly as it is in "Fat Man," except that you can push a
button which would cause the bridge's handrail to wobble, which in turn
would cause the fat man to topple in front of the trolley. Although there
is a factual difference, I think that there is no moral difference between
"Fat Man" and "Fat Man*." And it seems to me quite evident that
there is no moral difference between "Fat Man" and "Ramp." I do not
find it normatively plausible to suppose that the factual difference
between these two cases underwrites a moral difference between them.
How can it make a difference whether one pushes the button that causes
the fat man to fall into the path of the trolley or the button that causes
the trolley to "jump" toward the fat man? Thus, because there is no
reason to think that the pertinent judgments are not transitive, it should
be evident that there is no moral difference between "Fat Man" and
"Ramp."
Perhaps the reader will not have failed to notice a rather disconcerting
implication of the above remarks. I claim that "Fat Man" and "Ramp"
are morally on a par, and thus that "Fat Man" and "Ramp" are as well.
But "Ramp" is clearly morally on a par with "Bystander." Thus it
would seem that I am committed to saying that "Bystander" is morally
on a par with "Fat Man," and this result is rather alarming indeed.
After all, it is a presupposition of the Trolley Problem that it would be
permissible to save the five in "Bystander" but not in "Fat Man."
I am willing to accept this result because there is a plausibility argu-
ment for it that is implicit in what I have said above, and I do not see
how to challenge this argument. There are two steps, each of which
seems unassailable. First, "Bystander" is morally similar to "Ramp,"
because whether the trolley is shunted to the right or upward cannot be
morally significant. Second, "Ramp" is morally similar to "Fat Man,"
because whether one throws the trolley onto the fat man or throws the
[Vol. 4:105
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fat man onto the trolley cannot be morally significant. Thus, it is hard to
deny that "Bystander" is morally on a par with "Fat Man."
There is another route to the conclusion that the two cases must be
assimilated. Consider the following case, which I shall call "Jiggle-the-
Tracks I." A trolley is hurtling down a track toward five innocent per-
sons. As before, the brakes have failed, and there is no way of stopping
the trolley. You are a bystander watching the situation develop. You
notice that there is a spur of track leading to the right on which (very
close to the bifurcation of the tracks) stands one innocent person. You
also notice that you could push a button which would cause the tracks to
"jiggle" in such a way as to cause the trolley to go onto the right fork. If
you were to push the button, you would save the five persons but cause
the death of the one.
It seems to me that "Jiggle I" is morally on a par with "Bystander."
That is to say, if it is permissible to save the five in "Bystander," surely it
is permissible to save the five in "Jiggle I": there is no moral difference
between redirecting the trolley via the switching mechanism envisaged in
"Bystander" and the jiggling envisaged in "Jiggle I."
Imagine now a related case, "Jiggle-the-Tracks II." Everything is the
same here except for the manner of track-jiggling that would result from
your pushing the button. That is, there is a trolley hurtling down the
tracks toward five persons, with a spur leading to the right on which
there stands a man (very close to the point of track bifurcation). But this
time if you push the button, the tracks would be jiggled in such a way
that the man would be toppled onto the track in front of the trolley. We
can suppose that the man is large enough to stop the progress of the
trolley, but that if this were to occur, he would be killed.
It seems to me that this case is morally parallel to "Jiggle I" in the
sense that it would be morally permissible to push the button in "Jiggle
I" if and only if it would be morally permissible to do so in "Jiggle II."
How can it make a moral difference whether one jiggles the trolley onto
the man or the man onto the trolley?
Further, it should be apparent that "Jiggle II" is morally on a par with
"Fat Man*." In "Fat Man*" the man is jiggled down onto the train. In
"Jiggle II" the man is jiggled sideways. But surely this factual difference
cannot make a moral difference. As was argued above, "Fat Man*" is
morally on a par with "Fat Man." By transitivity, then, we have arrived
(again) at the assimilation of "Bystander" and "Fat Man."
By reasoning parallel to that which implies that "Fat Man" is morally
equivalent to "Bystander," one can show that "Fat Man" is morally
equivalent to "Transplant." That is, if one believes that "Fat Man" is
morally equivalent to "Bystander," one should also believe that "Fat
Man" is morally equivalent to "Transplant." To see this, begin by think-
1992]
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ing about the following example, "Shield." 5 Suppose that everything is
like the situation in "Fat Man" except for the following. You are a great
surgeon and you are standing next to the (unfortunate) fat man. You
cannot lift him, and he is so positioned that you cannot cause him to fall
in front of the trolley. But it turns out that you can (painlessly-your
technicians and nurses are with you) remove the fat man's inner organs
and construct a shield with them that would stop the trolley. Imagine
that this is the only way in which you could stop the train, and that the
fat man would die in the process.6
It seems to me that "Shield" is morally on a par with "Fat Man."
That is, if it is permissible to save the five in "Fat Man," it is also permis-
sible to save the five in "Shield." How could the difference between
throwing the fat man in front of the trolley and constructing a shield out
of his organs make a moral difference?
But "Shield" is clearly morally on a par with "Transplant" because it
involves taking one person's organs to save five people. So, it seems that
we must conclude that "Fat Man" is morally on a par with "Trans-
plant." Since we have already seen that "Bystander" and "Fat Man" are
morally on a par, we can conclude via transitivity that "Bystander" and
"Transplant" are morally on a par. That is to say, if it is morally permis-
sible to save the five in "Bystander," it is morally permissible to save the
five in "Transplant." Thus, we have reached the result that all three
cases-"Bystander," "Fat Man," and "Transplant"---ought to be assimi-
lated morally, despite one's first intuitive reaction that they should not be
assimilated with regard to the relevant permissibility claims.
The assimilation of "Bystander" and "Transplant" has proceeded via
the intermediate case, "Fat Man." But an argument for this assimilation
need not employ "Fat Man." Consider the following intermediate case,
"Scan." 7 Again, as in "Transplant," there are five people dying-this
time they are dying of some disease. Let us suppose that there is a scan-
ning device that can scan the brain of an individual (with certain neuro-
logical properties) and generate information that can be used to save the
five dying persons. Imagine further that there is an innocent visitor to
the hospital who is neurologically suited to the scan. Unfortunately, if
you do the scan, you kill this innocent person, for the scanning method is
lethal. You can save the five if you do the scan, but you will kill the one
if you do so, and this is the only way in which you could save the five.
It seems to me that "Bystander" and "Scan" are morally similar (as
regards the permissibility claim). In "Bystander" you can save the five
5. This example was presented to me by Gary Watson.
6. Ernest Partridge has pointed out to me, apropos of this example, that it can take guts to stop a
train. Also, both Dave Estlund and Greg Ravizza have suggested a variant of "Shield," "Lasso," in
which you make a lasso out of the poor fat man's organs and thus stop the train.
7. "Scan" is presented and discussed in Fischer, "Tooley and the Trolley."
[Vol. 4: 105
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only by directing the train onto the one; in "Scan" you can save the five
only by directing the lethal rays onto the one. Is there a moral difference
between a lethal trolley and lethal rays? It does not seem that there is
any factual difference that can plausibly be thought to make a moral
difference between these two cases.' Further, "Scan" seems to be mor-
ally similar to "Transplant." If these two claims are true and transitivity
holds for the relevant notion of moral similarity, then there is reason to
hold that "Bystander" and "Transplant" are morally similar. The con-
struction of an intermediate case, "Scan," thus leads to the moral assimi-
lation of "Bystander" and "Transplant," quite independent of
considerations pertinent to "Fat Man."
Imagine, also, the following case, which I shall call "Cart." There are
five healthy and innocent people in a waiting room in a hospital, and one
healthy and innocent person in a waiting room adjacent to the first.
There has been an earthquake, and a surgical cart-filled with very sharp
surgical instruments-is hurtling down the hall toward the room in
which the five people are waiting. Regrettably, you cannot stop the cart,
nor can you prevent it from entering the room with the five people,
except by deflecting it into the room in which the one person is waiting.
Further, let us suppose that the instruments are arranged in such a way
that, given the trajectory of the cart and the locations of the people, they
would all be impaled if you allowed the cart to proceed. Unfortunately,
if you shunted the cart into the other room, the instruments would
impale the one person. You cannot save the five without killing the one.
Now it seems to me that there is no moral difference (in the relevant
respects) between "Cart" and "Transplant." Although there plainly are
many factual differences, I do not see how they could underwrite a claim
that it would be permissible to save the five in one case ("Cart") but not
in the other ("Transplant").9 Further, there is obviously no moral differ-
ence (in the relevant respects) between "Cart" and "Bystander"-if it is
permissible to save the five in "Bystander," it is permissible to save the
five in "Cart." Thus, again, we are lead to the conclusion that
"Bystander" and "Transplant" are morally on a par.
The method of intermediation has been employed to generate the fol-
lowing results. "Bystander" was alleged to be morally similar to "Fat
Man." "Fat Man" was alleged to be morally similar to "Transplant."
Thus, it was concluded that "Bystander" is morally similar to "Trans-
plant." Further, independent arguments (not proceeding via "Fat Man")
8. I cannot here exhaustively canvass potential moral principles that would imply a difference
between "Bystander" and "Scan" and argue for their ultimate inadequacy. There are, however,
arguments against these alternative principles in Fischer, "Thoughts on the Trolley Problem" and
"Tooley and the Trolley"; and in Fischer and Ravizza, "Introduction: Moral Problems and
Principles" in Fischer and Ravizza, eds., Ethics; "Thomson and the Trolley"; and "Quinn on Doing
and Allowing."
9. See note 8.
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were adduced that show that "Bystander" and "Transplant" are morally
similar. The method of intermediation appears to show, then, that all
three cases are, at a deep level of analysis, morally similar with regard to
the relevant permissibility claims. This method of argumentation, then,
challenges the presuppositions of the Trolley Problem. Indeed, it threat-
ens to dissolve the problem.
IV
A.
The method of argumentation employed above-the method of inter-
mediation-generates at least some reasons to assimilate the original
three cases which constitute the Trolley Problem. The examples seem to
me quite striking and compelling. But the result to which they lead is
very surprising and challenging. It is, to put it mildly, highly unintuitive
that "Bystander" should be considered morally on a par with "Trans-
plant" as regards the permissibility of saving the five-this is a radical
and alarming conclusion. One should therefore be careful about jumping
hastily to any conclusion, and one should reflectively scrutinize the
methodology. It might be best to look at the argumentation in the above
section as posing a challenge. The challenge is to explain away the puta-
tive necessity of assimilation by pointing to what is wrong with the argu-
mentation or to reassess one's views about the examples. In the latter
case, one ought also to think about the significance of this reassessment;
specifically, one ought to attempt to fit one's new views about the exam-
ples with one's ethical theory or views about the nature of moral choice.
First, let me say a few words about the use of examples-actual and
hypothetical-in thinking about morality. Some philosophers have
objected to the use of examples-especially hypothetical examples--in
testing ethical theories or in seeking to understand practical reasoning.
They have raised various objections to the use of examples in moral theo-
rizing and in seeking guidance in practical affairs. Elsewhere, my co-
author and I have laid out some of these objections and have provided
some considerations in defense of the use of examples. '0 Here, I shall not
consider these general matters further, except to make the following
point. My criticism of the presuppositions of the Trolley Problem is an
internal criticism in the sense that the Trolley Problem presupposes the
relevance of hypothetical examples to ethical theorizing. I am most
decidedly not foisting upon the proponent of the Trolley Problem the
consideration of certain sorts of hypothetical examples; such a person is
already firmly in the tradition which considers such examples relevant.
Now someone might say that the examples I have adduced constitute a
10. See Fischer and Ravizza, "Introduction: Moral Problems and Principles."
[Vol. 4: 105
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reductio ad absurdum of the whole methodology. That is to say, one
might think that anyone who is willing to concede the relevance of hypo-
thetical examples to ethics must admit the cogency of the argumentation
presented above (which appears to demand an assimilation of the puzzle
cases). And one might conclude from this that one ought not concede
the relevance of such examples to ethics in the first place. As far as I can
see, this is an open option, and I do not propose to address it here.
Indeed, this option represents one way of fitting together one's reassess-
ment of the original examples and one's general views about ethical
theorizing.
What I do propose to undertake here is a consideration of one impor-
tant worry about the cogency of the method of argumentation employed
above. If this worry is controlling, then it would provide (part of) a
defense of the position that the Trolley Problem is a legitimate problem.
The worry I have in mind is that the method of intermediation employed
above may be illegitimate insofar as it is relevantly similar to the obvi-
ously specious forms of reasoning employed in sorites puzzles. Now it
may be controversial and unclear exactly what mistake the proponent of
sorites argumentation is making, but there is a general consensus that
such a theorist is making some mistake. If so, and if the method of inter-
mediation is relevantly similar to the sorites kind of argumentation, then
one could defend the presuppositions of the Trolley Problem against the
attack mounted above.
Briefly put, the sorites puzzle is a traditional problem in metaphysics.
The name comes from the Greek word for "heap." The puzzle concerns
when precisely a heap ceases to be a heap. That is to say, if you have a
heap of sand and you take one grain away, it seems intuitive that you still
have a heap of sand-how could taking one grain away make a heap into
something that is not a heap any more? But presumably if you start with
a heap of sand and continue taking grains away, at some point you will
not have a heap any more. At what point does the heap cease to be a
heap? How could taking away one grain from a heap transform it into a
"non-heap"? These are some of the problems involved in the sorites puz-
zle. (Of course, the same puzzle can be applied to other sorts of entities.)
It must be admitted that there is aprimafacie problem here. After all,
I have (in section III) strung together various cases, claiming that, since
case A is morally equivalent to case B and case B is morally equivalent to
case C, then case A is morally equivalent to case C. (Sometimes the
string includes more than three cases.) Is this sort of argumentation ille-
gitimate? Is it relevantly similar to the specious kind of sorites
argumentation?
I shall begin by giving some examples of arguments which appear to be
paradigmatic examples of problematic sorites arguments. I shall give a
metaphysical sorites argument and also two moral sorites arguments.
1992]
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Having presented these arguments, I shall develop some considerations
by reference to which it can be seen that the method of intermediation
used above is importantly different from the sorites arguments.
Let us consider very briefly a metaphysical sorites. Think about any
old swizzle stick. (Of course, nothing depends on the choice of this par-
ticular sort of object; it is simply an arbitrary.) If you take away one
molecule, it is, presumably, still a swizzle stick. And, in general, it seems
to be true that if an object with N molecules is a swizzle stick, then that
object would still be a swizzle stick, if you took away one molecule. But
now we can obviously generate the (mortifying) result that an object
with, say, one molecule is a swizzle stick. (One is tempted to say that it
would have to be a very small martini indeed!)
The result in question emanates from two claims: an existence claim
and an assimilation claim. The existence claim is really a "possible exist-
ence claim." It claims that it is possible that there should be a certain
sort of object-let us say a swizzle stick of N molecules. Now the assimi-
lation claim here has the logical form of a universally quantified condi-
tional: it says that, for any N, if you had a swizzle stick of N molecules
and you took away one molecule, you would still have a swizzle stick.
These ingredients generate the paradoxical result. More specifically, the
paradox consists in the apparent plausibility of the premises (the exist-
ence claim and the assimilation claim), the soundness of the reasoning,
and the manifest implausibility of the conclusion.
Now let us consider a few moral sorites arguments. First, it should be
evident that the above sort of sorites reasoning can be applied to moral
properties, such as "is a person." Think about any person of, say, N
molecules. If you take away one molecule, the person is, presumably,
still a person. And, in general, it seems to be true that if an object with N
molecules is a person, then that object would still be a person if you took
away one molecule. But now we can obviously generate the (alarming)
result that an object with one molecule is a person. The reasoning is
precisely parallel to the reasoning above, except that we are here dealing
with a moral notion.
Here is another sorites argument in regard to a moral notion. It is,
presumably, morally wrong to torture someone for ten hours. That is,
given that you have no reason (other than that you want to see someone
else suffer) to torture someone, it is morally wrong to do so. But, surely,
if it is morally wrong to torture someone for ten hours, it is also morally
wrong to torture someone for nine hours, fifty-nine minutes, and fifty-
nine seconds. In general, if it is morally wrong to torture someone for N
seconds, it is morally wrong to torture someone for N-1 seconds. But it
is an obvious implication of the above considerations that it is morally
wrong to torture someone for zero seconds, (i.e., that it is morally wrong
not to torture someone at all) and this is clearly unacceptable. Again, as
[Vol. 4: 105
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above, the paradoxical result emanates from an existence claim-that
there is a (possible) case of torturing someone for N seconds which is
impermissible-and a universally quantified assimilation claim-that if it
is morally wrong to torture someone for N seconds, it is morally wrong
to torture someone for N-1 seconds.
It is also possible to construct a moral sorites that issues in the conclu-
sion (arrived at by a different route than above) that it is permissible to
save the five in "Transplant." We start with the claim that it would be
morally permissible to extract the relevant organs (painlessly) one second
before the individual would otherwise have died. Now the relevant
assimilation thesis is: for any N, if it is morally permissible painlessly to
extract the relevant organs N seconds before someone dies, then it is
morally permissible to extract the organs N+1 seconds before the indi-
vidual dies. But now it is evident how we can get to the result that it is
permissible to save the five in "Transplant." Of course, it was suggested
above that this claim is worth taking seriously; but it is in any case evi-
dent that the current route to the conclusion is entirely unacceptable.
Having presented these examples of sorites arguments-metaphysical
and moral-I am now able to state the worry about the method of inter-
mediation rather crisply: how is the method of intermediation different
from the form of argumentation involved in the clearly problematic
sorites arguments?
B.
The answer to the worry can also be stated crisply, although it is a
rather more delicate matter to give explicit content to the answer. I shall
state in a somewhat abstract way what I believe the answer is, and then I
shall attempt to give more precise content to it. I believe that, even if the
specific way in which I undertake to explicate the answer is not entirely
satisfactory, the broad outlines of the answer will still be correct. The
specious sorites arguments all exploit the phenomenon of vagueness to
derive their conclusions, whereas the method of intermediation does not.
This is, I believe, the difference between the sorites arguments and the
method of intermediation.
Recall the metaphysical sorites pertaining to the swizzle stick. The
argument exploits the vagueness of the boundaries of a particular swizzle
stick. Intuitively, swizzle sticks are such that it is not the case that one
can have a swizzle stick and then take away one molecule and thereby
create an object which is not a swizzle stick. In contrast, if the bounda-
ries of swizzle sticks were not vague, there would be a determinate, pre-
cise point (in the sequence of subtraction of molecules) at which objects
went from being swizzle sticks to not being swizzle sticks. It is this
vagueness which evidently underwrites the assimilation thesis, which (as
noted above) has the form of a universally quantified conditional. Simi-
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larly, in the examples of moral sorites adduced above, the phenomenon
of vagueness is exploited in certain ways.
Note that in all of the sorites arguments-metaphysical and moral-
the assimilation theses are universally quantified conditionals. This is a
symptom of the fact that they all exploit the phenomenon of vagueness.
If a given notion involves vagueness, then there is some relevant contin-
uum along which there is no point that is a definite boundary or cut-off
point. Basically, this is what the universally quantified assimilation the-
ses express. In contrast, the assimilation theses in the arguments
presented above that employ the method of intermediation are not uni-
versally quantified conditionals; they are (or can be understood as) iden-
tity statements linking a few (two, three, four) cases. This is an
indication that the method of intermediation is not exploiting the phe-
nomenon of vagueness. The logical form of the assimilation theses in the
sorites cases and the arguments employing the method of intermediation
are crucially different, and this difference in logical form points to an
important difference in the nature of the arguments: whereas the sorites
arguments exploit aspects of the phenomenon of vagueness in an illegiti-
mate fashion, the method of intermediation in no way depends upon
vagueness. (This is not to say that the subject matter of the claims in the
arguments employing the method of intermediation does not admit of
vagueness. Rather, the point is that the method of intermediation does
not illicitly fix upon and exploit this vagueness to generate its results.)
An alternative way of making the point that the two types of argu-
ments are importantly different is as follows. The pattern of argumenta-
tion I have used above-the method of intermediation--does not have
the surface form of the specious sort of sorites pattern. In the sorites
pattern, one typically finds an inductive clause of roughly the following
kind: if entity E has some property P, then some entity suitably related to
E, E+1, has P. The paradoxical results are then generated by an
extremely large number of applications of this inductive clause to some
basic case. (The inductive clause is what I above called the assimilation
claim, and the basic case was posited by what I called the existence
claim.) But the form of the method of intermediation is fundamentally
different; there is not a very large number of applications of some induc-
tive clause specifying some very small change. Rather, three or four
cases are alleged to be identical with regard to one feature of their moral
status (although admittedly factually different in certain respects). In the
sorites, there is a huge number of applications of some tiny change, and
this (together with the fact of a certain sort of continuity) is exploited to
generate the paradoxical results; in the arguments employing the method
of intermediation, a few cases which are substantially different factually
(i.e., which do not differ only in some tiny way) are alleged to be morally
similar in the relevant respects.
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I have just presented what I take to be the broad outlines of an answer
to the question of what distinguishes the method of argumentation I used
above from the bad old sorites form of argumentation. I wish now to
make some tentative and preliminary efforts toward giving the answer
more specific content. There are good reasons to believe that all of the
sorites arguments are unsound: although the reasoning employed is valid,
it is not the case that both premises (the existence claim and the assimila-
tion claim) are true. Specifically, there are good reasons to think that the
assimilation claims fail to be true. In contrast, there are no such reasons
to deny the truth of the assimilation claims in the arguments which
employ the method of intermediation. (In the final section of this paper,
I consider the possibility that there are certain other reasons to deny the
assimilation claims embodied in the arguments based on the method of
intermediation.)
I shall now outline one way of solving the sorites puzzles. 1' I empha-
size that this is the barest sketch of a solution, which would have to be
filled in and defended against various objections if it were to be consid-
ered a serious candidate for a solution to the sorites puzzle. Here it suf-
fices to lay out the main features of the approach, and to show how it
would allegedly both solve the sorites puzzles and not similarly debunk
the method of intermediation.
Let us start with the metaphysical sorites pertaining to the swizzle
stick. Intuitively, the sorites illicitly exploits the vagueness of the bound-
aries of swizzle sticks-the fact that swizzle sticks do not have precise
cut-off points. Given a particular swizzle stick, the vagueness of the
boundaries of swizzle sticks implies that there are three classes of mole-
cules: those molecules which are clearly inside the swizzle stick, those
clearly outside the swizzle stick, and those of which it is neither true nor
false that they are inside (or outside) the swizzle stick. The third class
comprises a fuzzy penumbra of the swizzle stick: it is not clear whether
any one of the molecules in the penumbra is inside or outside the swizzle
stick.
In order to talk about such penumbral regions, it has been supposed
(by some) that we need a three-valued logic or semantics. 2 On a three-
valued logic, there would be the values, "True," "False," and "Indeter-
minate." Further, according to a plausible semantics for such a logic, a
universally quantified statement would be true only if all of its instantia-
tions would be true; thus, if some instantiations of a universal generaliza-
11. In presenting this approach, I am heavily indebted to ideas in Michael Tye, "Vague
Objects," Mind XCIX (October 1990): 535-57.
12. For further discussion of this issue and related issues, see Tye, "Vague Objects." See also Kit
Fine, "Vagueness, Truth, and Logic," Synthese (April/May 1975): 265-300.
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tion are false or indeterminate, the universal generalization fails to be
true.
On such an approach-which of course would need to be filled in and
explained more thoroughly-it can be argued that the sorites problem of
the swizzle stick is unsound. This is because its assimilation thesis fails
to be true. Recall that this assimilation thesis is a universally quantified
conditional of roughly this form: "For any number N, if you have a swiz-
zle stick with N molecules and you take one molecule away, then you
still have a swizzle stick."'" But remember that there is a class of mole-
cules of which it is neither true nor false that they are in the swizzle stick.
Given this fact, there will be numbers such that if you have an object
with those numbers of molecules, it will be indeterminate whether it is a
swizzle stick. Further, there will be at least one such number, N*, such
that it is indeterminate whether an object with N* molecules is a swizzle
stick and also indeterminate whether an object with N*-l molecules is a
swizzle stick. Given these facts, the universally quantified conditional
has at least one instantiation in which both its antecedent and consequent
are indeterminate. Under such circumstances, it is plausible to ascribe
the truth value, "Indeterminate," to the instantiation of the conditional.
Thus, it is not the case that all of the instantiations of the generalization
are true. It follows that the universal generalization (which is the assimi-
lation thesis) fails to be true. And if so, the argument (which proceeds
from the existence claim and the assimilation claim) is not sound.
Precisely the same considerations apply to the moral sorites pertaining
to the notion of "person." Because of the vagueness of persons, there is a
penumbra of molecules associated with persons: this penumbra is the set
of molecules which are not definitely "inside" and not definitely
"outside" of the person. Thus, there will be some numbers N* such that
it will be indeterminate whether an object with N* (or N*-I) molecules is
indeed a person. Thus, the relevant instantiations of the universal gener-
alization will be indeterminate, and the universal generalization itself
(which constitutes the assimilation claim) will not be true. Thus, the
argument is not sound.
I have claimed that all of the sorites arguments exploit the phenome-
non of vagueness in illicit ways. Further, I have shown how a certain
strategy of response can be applied to both the metaphysical sorites argu-
ment pertaining to the swizzle stick and the moral sorites pertaining to
the notion of personhood. I would claim that the same strategy works in
the case of the sorites having to do with organ removal. I believe that a
13. I employ here a bit of technical terminology from quantification theory (or first-order
predicate calculus). A "universally quantified" statement is of the form "For all x, F(x)." An
instantiation of this universal generalization would be of the form "F(b) for some specific b." See,
for example, Donald Kalish and Richard Montague, Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning, 2nd
ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovonovich, 1980), 88, 99.
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slightly different strategy can be applied to the moral sorites in regard to
the impermissibility of torture. Both moral sorites exploit the apparent
vagueness of the relevant notions: the boundaries of personhood and the
sequence of episodes of different intervals of torture. But whereas the
boundaries of a particular person are genuinely vague, the vagueness in
the sequence of episodes of torture is, I believe, merely apparent. The
argument exploits the apparent vagueness of the sequence, but to deem
the sequence genuinely vague is to commit a certain sort of error.
The response to the sorites has two important elements. First, one
must avoid what Derek Parfit has called a "mistake in moral mathemat-
ics"-"ignoring small effects."' 4 One second less torture is less bad than
one second more, even if by an extremely small amount. Also, it seems
to me that the nature of the sequence of episodes of torture is importantly
different from the nature of the boundaries of persons: it is precise. That
is to say, although it is (primafacie) wrong to torture someone for even a
very short time, say, a second, it is not (prima facie) morally wrong to
refrain from torturing someone at all. If there really are moral differ-
ences that issue from small changes in the amount of time of infliction of
pain and the sequence of episodes of such infliction of pain is precise in
the way I have suggested above, then one can say that the universal gen-
eralization which constitutes the assimilation claim is false.'5
Now it may be that I am wrong about what I have said concerning the
logical structure of this sorites. And it may be that similar sorites could
be constructed (employing genuinely vague sequences of infliction of
pain). If so, I would simply fall back on the first strategy of response
(according to which the assimilation thesis is indeterminate). I do, how-
ever, believe that there are two distinct types of moral sorites. Although
they both involve universally quantified assimilation theses and thus
exploit the apparent vagueness of certain phenomena, one set of moral
phenomena is genuinely vague, while the other is only apparently so.
Although the two strategies of response to the two sorts of sorites are
slightly different, they are clearly related. They both claim that the
sorites arguments are not sound because the assimilation premises are
not true. In the first instance, where there is genuine vagueness, the
assimilation premise is not true insofar as it is indeterminate. In the sec-
ond instance, the assimilation premise is not true because there is no gen-
uine vagueness. To the extent that a sound argument must have true
premises, in both instances the sorites arguments are shown not to be
sound.
14. Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 75-82.
15. Note that it is not enough (to block the sorites) to identify the possibility of mistakes in
moral mathematics which are based upon failing to remember that small quantities can make a
difference. This is because there is presumably an analogous phenomenon with respect to "tallness."
It is also necessary to posit that the sequence has definite boundaries.
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To summarize, the various sorites arguments-metaphysical and
moral-have a different logical form from the arguments employing the
method of intermediation. This difference is a symptom of the fact that
the sorites arguments illicitly exploit aspects of the phenomenon of
vagueness, whereas the arguments employing the method of intermedia-
tion do not. Further, I have sketched (in a preliminary and admittedly
epigrammatic fashion) a strategy of response to the sorites arguments.
This method of response targets the crucial assimilation theses; these are
appropriate targets insofar as it is precisely a feature of these claims (the
fact that the assimilation theses are universally quantified conditionals)
that allows the arguments to exploit vagueness in an unseemly fashion.
Finally, my claim is that a similar response does not apply to the argu-
ments employing the method of intermediation. The fact that the assimi-
lation claims in the arguments employing the method of intermediation
are of a different form points to the fact that they are importantly differ-
ent. They do not attempt to exploit the phenomenon of vagueness, and
they cannot be defeated via the strategy of response applied to the sorites
arguments. Thus, it can be seen precisely how the two different routes to
the conclusion that it is permissible to save the five in "Transplant" dif-
fer: whereas the sorites route is unsound, the route employing the
method of intermediation is not. 6
Above I have merely sketched a certain approach to responding to
some of the sorites arguments. This approach involves positing a third
semantic value, "Indeterminate." I certainly have not developed the
approach in detail. Nor have I defended it against various objections.
Ultimately, it may turn out that this approach is unacceptable. 7 Note,
however, that this would not vitiate my claim that the sorites arguments
have an importantly different structure from that of the arguments
employing the method of intermediation. I suppose that even if this
strategy of response to the sorites is found to be untenable, the fact that
an initially plausible strategy of analysis implies that the sorites argu-
ments are unsound but does not imply that the arguments employing the
method of intermediation are unsound provides at least some reason to
think that the two kinds of arguments are importantly different.'"
16. The argumentation employing the method of intermediation results in certain moral
assimilations, such as that of "Bystander" and "Transplant." To get the result that it is indeed
permissible to save the five in "Transplant," one needs the further claim that it is permissible to save
the five in "Bystander."
17. For an interesting recent discussion of the sorites problem, see Mark Heller, The Ontology of
Physical Objects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. 68-109.
18. Of course, if it could be shown that the reason that the strategy of analysis fails to resolve the
sorites paradox-if in fact it does fail-is precisely some feature of it which implies that the sorites
arguments are different in structure from the arguments employing the method of intermediation,
then the reason (alluded to in the text) would have been overridden (or preempted). I am not,
however, sanguine about this possibility.
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Someone might grant all of what I have said and still claim that the
assimilation theses embedded in the arguments employing the method of
intermediation are logically problematic. Although these assimilation
theses are not vulnerable to the objections to which the parallel theses in
the sorites arguments are vulnerable, they might nevertheless be logically
flawed in different ways. I turn now to a consideration of various ver-
sions of this objection.
Recall that the method of intermediation posits a number of cases
which are alleged to be relevantly similar. They are supposed to be factu-
ally similar in such a way as to entail no difference with regard to the
relevant permissibility claims. We are dealing, then, with a sequence of
cases which are alleged to have two kinds of properties: underlying
causal-physical properties and supervenient moral properties (concerning
permissibility).
Now one objection to the cogency of the method of intermediation
(and the assimilation theses which putatively issue from it) is as follows.
It may be the case that properties at one level can be subsumed under a
single higher-level property and nevertheless be different properties. So,
for example, different particular shades of gray are all subsumed under
"gray"; nevertheless, they are not identical shades. Similarly, it would
clearly be a mistake to assimilate cases which are different factually, sim-
ply because they both have the same moral property or fall under the
same moral judgments.
One should not say that two cases are factually identical simply
because they can be seen to have the same moral property. So, even if
"Bystander" and "Transplant" are morally equivalent, it would not fol-
low that they are factually the same, just as it does not follow from two
shades' being shades of gray that they are the same shade. Sameness at
the supervenient level does not entail sameness at the underlying level.
But, of course, these sorts of objectionable claims are not made by the
proponent of the method of intermediation. It is never alleged that the
relevant cases are factually identical; the claim is merely that they are
factually similar in such a way as to allow no moral difference with
regard to the relevant permissibility claims. Thus, two shades, although
clearly different shades, may both be shades of gray.
But let us look more carefully at the particular sequence involving
"Bystander," "Ramp," and "Fat Man." The argument was that
"Bystander" and "Ramp" are morally on a par, "Ramp" and "Fat Man"
are morally on a par, and thus "Bystander" and "Fat Man" are morally
on a par. More specifically, the argument is that the first two cases share
some causal-physical property (or set of properties) by virtue of which
they are morally similar in the relevant respect, and that the same is true
of the second two cases. Thus, the first and third cases share some
1992]
17
Fischer: The Trolley and the Sorites
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1992
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
causal-physical property by virtue of which they are morally similar in
the relevant respect.
This sort of argumentation can be fallacious in certain contexts. For
example, consider the following situation. Objects can have different col-
ors (say on different parts). So, object 1 and object 2 can share the color
red. In virtue of this common underlying property, object 1 and object 2
share the supervenient property, "having the same color (on some part or
other)." And object 2 and object 3 can share the color blue. Because of
this common underlying property, object 2 and object 3 share the super-
venient property, "having the same color (on some part or other)." But
it is clear that the above facts do not imply that objects 1 and 3 have the
property of sharing the same color on some part or other-they may
have no parts which share colors.
The reasoning described above is clearly fallacious. But the reasoning
involved in the argumentation employing the method of intermediation is
different. Note that there is a shift in the underlying property under
consideration when moving from the first pair of cases (object 1 and
object 2) to the second pair of cases (object 2 and object 3). The shift is
from red to blue. This shift is what causes the problem, and the problem
is created in part by the fact that the relevant properties-blue and
red-are "compossible" (i.e., jointly exemplifiable). That is, the relevant
properties are "being part red" and "being part blue"; these are compos-
sible, and are jointly exemplified by object 2. Given this, the shift issues
in the problematic result.
In contrast, the method of intermediation involves no shift in underly-
ing properties. The underlying property in the above argumentation
which employs the method of intermediation (for example, in the
sequence, "Bystander," "Ramp," "Fat Man") is something like "being
physically such as not to allow any relevant moral difference." This
property and its complement are not compossible, and there is no shift in
properties when proceeding from the first pair of cases to the second.
Thus, nothing similar to the objectionable form of reasoning involving
blue and red can be going on in the argumentation employing the method
of intermediation.
Let us now consider a final version of the worry about the assimilation
theses involved in the method of intermediation. Consider a sequence of
colors. More specifically, consider a continuous sequence of physical
propensities to reflect light which underlies a supervenient sequence of
colors. Let us further suppose that although the sequence of propensities
is continuous, propensity P1 is considerably different from propensity
P3-so different that they clearly are instances of different colors. It may
nevertheless be the case that propensity P1 and propensity P2 are both
instances of the same supervenient color, say, blue. And it may also be
the case that propensity P2 and propensity P3 are instances of the same
[Vol. 4: 105
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color, say green. Note that this configuration of claims requires that P2
be such as to admit of two "descriptions" or supervenient properties-
blue and green. It is, we might say, "blue-green." Note that these are not
descriptions of parts of objects, but (putatively) equally accurate descrip-
tions of the entire propensity (or the entire objects which manifest the
propensity). Thus, by transitivity it would seem to follow that P1 and P3
are instances of the same color. But this is, by hypothesis, false.
The reasoning here is clearly fallacious. But again it is not the sort of
reasoning involved in the above argumentation employing the method of
intermediation. What is problematic in the fallacious reasoning just
presented is not a shift in an underlying compossible property, but a shift
in a supervenient compossible property. When one assimilates propensi-
ties P1 and P2, one is thinking of them as both blue; and when one
assimilates propensities P2 and P3, one is thinking of them as both green.
The fallacious move is made possible by the fact that both blue and green
(allegedly) can supervene on the same underlying physical propensity to
reflect light.
But notice that nothing like this can be going on in the argumentation
employing the method of intermediation. In this argumentation, the rel-
evant underlying property is something like "physically such as not to
allow any moral difference," and the relevant supervenient properties are
moral properties such as "permissible to save the five" or "impermissible
to save the five." When one argues that "Bystander" is to be assimilated
to "Ramp" and "Ramp" is to be assimilated to "Fat Man," one is not
proceeding in the following (admittedly problematic) way. One is not
saying first that in "Bystander" and "Ramp" it is permissible to save the
five (and thus the cases are morally equivalent in the relevant respect),
and second that in "Ramp" and "Fat Man" it is impermissible to save
the five (and thus the cases are morally equivalent in the relevant
respect), and finally (by transitivity) that "Bystander" and "Fat Man"
are thus morally equivalent in the relevant respect. This would indeed
render the reasoning parallel to the fallacious reasoning presented above.
Rather, one is simply sticking to the underlying causal-physical prop-
erty of being such as not to allow any moral difference. One is saying
that "Bystander" and "Ramp" are physically such as not to allow any
moral difference, "Ramp" and "Fat Man" are physically such as not to
allow any moral difference, and thus "Bystander" and "Fat Man" are
physically such as not to allow any moral difference. Note further that
the supervenient moral properties, "permissible to save the five," and
"impermissible to save the five" are not compossible. (These properties
of course have been understood to represent "all-things-considered"
judgments, rather than mere prima facie judgments.) Thus, the argu-
mentation employing the method of intermediation cannot be problem-
atic in the way in which the reasoning involving blue-green is.
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In this section I have undertaken to defend the plausibility of the rea-
soning employing the method of intermediation against certain claims
that it involves logical errors. I do not think that it is logically deficient.
It may well be that the reasoning involves false claims or is otherwise
infelicitous; I have not addressed these issues. Rather, I have simply
attempted to defend the logical integrity of the form of reasoning.
Let me be a bit more explicit about this point. Whenever one presents
a string of analogies (as I have above), one is essentially claiming that the
pairs of cases are relevantly similar (or perhaps identical) in some respect
(or respects). A clear logical error (or at least quasi-logical error) would
be to shift respects. On the other hand, one might conceivably be making
another sort of error: it might be that one's claims about the alleged simi-
larities or identities are false. I have primarily been concerned with argu-
ing that there are no obvious logical (or quasi-logical) errors in the
argumentation that employs the method of intermediation as presented
above.
Someone could, I suppose, challenge particular claims I have made
about the cases. This would not be to challenge the logic of the argumen-
tation, but it would challenge the soundness of the arguments (and thus
the truth of the conclusions). Note, however, the very implausible claims
that would need to be made by the proponent of such a challenge. Such
a theorist would need to deny the moral assimilation (as regards the rele-
vant claims) of cases such as "Bystander" and "Ramp." Perhaps this
theorist would say that it is permissible to save the five in "Bystander"
but impermissible to save the five in "Ramp." Or perhaps this person
would say that it is permissible to save the five in "Bystander" but inde-
terminate whether or not it is permissible to save the five in "Ramp."
But given the causal-factual structure of the cases, it is highly implausible
to make such claims.
Note, finally, that it is extremely reasonable to think that at least some
forms of reasoning employing transitivity must be valid, even if the
sorites form of argumentation is rejected; it certainly does not follow
from the existence of fallacious kinds of sorites arguments that any argu-
ment employing transitivity is unacceptable. Surely, some arguments in
some contexts which employ transitivity are not relevantly similar to
sorites arguments.
VI
Consequentialists and hybrid theorists 9 have this in common: they
believe that it is always permissible to act in such a way that one would
maximize the good consequences of what one does for the community as
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a whole. Consequentialists also believe that it is always obligatory so to
act, whereas hybrid theorists deny this. That is to say, whereas a conse-
quentialist argues that one ought always to maximize the good conse-
quences of one's behavior for the community as a whole, the hybrid
theorist holds that it is not obligatory always to maximize the good con-
sequences of one's behavior; rather, he argues that, whereas it is always
permissible to perform the maximizing action, it is sometimes permissible
to pursue one's own projects and commitments at the expense of maxi-
mizing good consequences for the community as a whole. Thus, the the-
ory is a "hybrid" of consequentialism and non-consequentialism
(deontology): consequentialist considerations apply to the relevant per-
missibility claims, whereas non-consequentialist considerations are
allowed to play a role in the obligation claims.
Call the claim which consequentialists and hybrid theorists share, the
"Permissibility Claim." I believe that the pattern of argumentation
presented above (which generates reasons to assimilate the original cases)
lends some support to the Permissibility Claim. Of course, it does not in
itself establish such a claim, since the force of the argumentation is,
strictly speaking, to assimilate various cases. It is this assimilation in
conjunction with the further claim that it seems to be permissible to save
the five in such cases as "Bystander" that yields support for the Permissi-
bility Claim. Indeed, what is required is rather more than the assimila-
tion claim and this claim about "Bystander"; one needs the claim that it
is more plausible that the apparent permissibility of saving the five in
"Bystander" should transfer to the other cases (given the assimilation
claim) than that the apparent impermissibility of saving the five in
"Transplant" should transfer to the other cases. (I feel some sympathy
for this latter proposition, but I do not know how to argue for it.)
Philosophers such as Samuel Scheffier have argued that, whereas one
can give an account of the picture of rationality which underlies conse-
quentialism and the hybrid theory, it is difficult to construct a parallel
account for non-consequentialism. Thus, insofar as one thinks that a
normative ethical theory ought to be supported by some view about
rationality, one has some reason to prefer consequentialism and the
hybrid theory to non-consequentialism. Also, these theories appear to be
preferable to certain versions of non-consequentialist or deontological
approaches insofar as they are relatively systematic and algorithmic
rather than intuitionistic. It might seem, then, that on general theoreti-
cal grounds, the Permissibility Claim is, at least, attractive.
But the existence of the kinds of cases involved in the Trolley Problem
has caused anxiety about rushing to embrace the Permissibility Claim.
Judith Jarvis Thomson begins her classic piece by saying, "Morally
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speaking it may matter a great deal how a death comes about.. .,2o And
many have felt that the kinds of cases involved in the Trolley Problem
provide strong reasons to reject the Permissibility Claim and to embrace
some sort of non-consequentialism, despite the neatness and theoretical
appeal of the Permissibility Claim. That is, non-consequentialist (deon-
tological) approaches are often motivated by appeal to graphic hypotheti-
cal examples (of the sort discussed above), in which it is alleged that it is
intuitively clear that the consequentialist and hybrid prescriptions are
objectionable.
The significance, then, of the pattern of argumentation presented
above is to provide support for the Permissibility Claim by casting some
doubt on what is often taken to be a major obstacle to the acceptance of
the Permissibility Claim." If what I have suggested is true, then the
sorts of cases involved in the Trolley Problem do not provide decisive
reason to reject the Permissibility Claim and to embrace non-
consequentialism. Of course, I do not claim that the cases I have
adduced provide decisive reason to accept the Permissibility Claim-
only that they generate a challenge to the view that certain cases provide
insuperable obstacles to acceptance of the Permissibility Claim. Thus, I
believe that I have provided some reason to doubt the main source of
support for deontological ethical theories and the main source of anxiety
about consequentialist and hybrid approaches. If the claim that conse-
quentialist and hybrid approaches are in danger of countenancing obvi-
ously morally repugnant behavior-behavior which can readily be
distinguished intuitively from permissible behavior-is called into ques-
tion, then the appeal of deontology is substantially vitiated, and conse-
quentialist and hybrid approaches are rendered significantly more
attractive.22
20. Thomson, "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem," 204.
21. Of course, in order to provide strong support for the Permissibility Claim, one would have to
explore many difficult and complicated issues. There are, admittedly, delicate and hard issues which
are relevant to the use of hypothetical examples of certain sorts to test ethical theories. These issues
are clearly beyond the scope of this paper. (There will be some discussion of these issues in Fischer
and Ravizza, eds., forthcoming 1991.) It should be pointed out that the argumentation presented in
this paper provides an internal critique of the conclusions that some draw from the Trolley Problem.
That is, if the original examples provide reasonable tests of a normative ethical theory, then the
examples adduced here also seem to provide such tests. It would appear to me to be arbitrary to
claim that, whereas discussion of the original cases is fair game, discussion of the other examples is
not.
22. I have discussed the above issues with members of the UCLA Law and Philosophy
Discussion Group, especially David Copp. Also, I have discussed these issues with members of the
Moral and Political Philosophy Society of Orange County, especially Gary Watson and David
Estland. I am grateful to these people, and also my colleigue, Alex Rosenberg, for their helpful
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